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1. Introduction
In this article the term ‘modality’, when unmodified, will refer to metaphys-
ical modality. Metaphysical modality is what is expressed by ‘possible’ and
variants such as ‘possibly’, as well as ‘it could have been the case that . . . ’ and
variants, when these are used in the broadest objective sense. (Metaphysical
necessity is the dual of metaphysical possibility, i.e. it is metaphysically ne-
cessary that p iff it is not metaphysically possible that it is not the case that p.)
Perhaps the most straightforward way to characterize objective modality is
negatively: it is what the modal words express when they are not used in any
epistemic or deontic sense (a more precise characterization would take us too
far afield).1 Metaphysical modality is what these words express when they
express objective modality and are not understood as restricted in any way.
For example, ‘Trump could not have won California’ is true on various
restricted objective readings, but in the completely unrestricted objective
sense it could have been the case that Trump won California. In this sense,
Trump could also have orbited Neptune, bicycled from Midtown Manhattan
to Teotihuaca´n in one day, owned 17 talking donkeys, and had ever so many
other extremely improbable achievements to his name; but he could not have
been Hillary Clinton or any other individual actually distinct from Trump
(although he could have looked, sounded, smelled, etc., exactly like Hillary
Clinton and many others). The epistemology of modality inquires into the
circumstances in which we can obtain knowledge that something is possibly
so or necessarily so, in this sense.
The aim of this article is to survey the most important developments in the
epistemology of modality of the last decade. (Some of the work we will
discuss is more than a decade old, but in such cases it is part of a research
program that extends into the last decade.) Much of the interest in the topic
traces back to several decades earlier, when a revolution occurred in philoso-
phers’ understanding of the varieties of modality – a revolution in large part
effected by a single work: Kripke’s (1980) Naming and Necessity (N&N).
N&N is largely responsible for our appreciation of the category of metaphys-
ical modality and for distinguishing it from various epistemic and semantic
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notions in the vicinity. (Kripke was by no means the first philosopher to focus
on the metaphysical senses of the modal words. In doing so he was arguably
rediscovering forgotten insights of the medieval period).2 Some of N&N’s
central theses have become orthodoxy: in particular, the claim that there are
necessary a posteriori truths, and the claim that there are contingent a priori
truths. For example, contemporary orthodoxy holds that it is necessary but a
posteriori that Hesperus¼ Phosphorus, as well as that the atomic number of
gold is 79, and that it is a priori but contingent that Hesperus is visible in the
evening iff Hesperus is actually visible in the evening.3 This revolution has
caused many philosophers to reconsider how modal knowledge is possible.
While Kripke himself has had little to say on the topic beyond some brief,
suggestive remarks, N&N has been influential in shaping the discussion to
the present day. Indeed, N&N contains passages that are suggestive of, and
have been cited as inspiration for, each of the three main approaches we will
discuss.4
We will use standard logical notation for abbreviation and clarity. In par-
ticular, ‘œp’ will abbreviate ‘It is necessary that p’, and ‘Sp’ will abbreviate
‘œp’ and can also be read as ‘It is possible that p’. We will use abbrevi-
ations/names for two paradigms of the necessary a posteriori: ‘H¼P’ and ‘G’
will, depending on the context, either abbreviate, respectively, the sentences
‘Hesperus¼ Phosphorus’ and ‘The atomic number of gold is 79’, or serve as
names for the propositions expressed by those sentences.
2. Imaginability and possibility
One common view whose roots trace back much further than N&N is this:5
imaginability (or conceivability if these are distinct) entails possibility, per-
haps with some exceptions. If so, there will be ways of coming to know that
Sp that involve imagining that p. For example, one might imagine that p,
know that one imagined that p, know the entailment, and use it to infer that
Sp. Or one might reliably form the belief thatSp when one imagines that p.
If imaginability entails possibility, then both of these are ways of acquiring
knowledge of possibility, and there may well be other ways. The literature
has focused on the alleged entailment rather than the ways one could acquire
knowledge of possibility given the entailment, and this will also be our focus.
The most sophisticated development of an idea of this general shape is to
be found in Chalmers’s (2002, 2006, 2012) program of epistemic two-dimen-
sionalism. In Chalmers’s theory, the role of conceivability is played by the
2 See Knuuttila 1993.
3 The last example is not Kripke’s. See Kaplan 1989: 539, n. 65.
4 We cite relevant passages of N&N at the beginning of each of §§2–4.
5 See N&N: 127 and Hume 1968: 32.
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dual of a priority: it is, in the relevant sense, conceivable that p iff it is not a
priori that it is not the case that p. We’ll say that p is Chalmers-conceivable iff
p is conceivable in this sense. In Chalmers’s theory each sentence is associated
with a two-dimensional (2D) intension, a kind of meaning that encodes cer-
tain of its epistemic and modal properties. On a first approximation,
Chalmers’s theory associates each sentence u with a 2D-intension I(u),
which is a function from worlds, considered as epistemic possibilities of a
certain kind, to functions from metaphysically possible worlds to truth
values. In particular, the worlds I(u) takes as arguments are to be thought
of as maximally Chalmers-conceivable propositions, i.e. propositions p such
that it is Chalmers-conceivable that p, and, for each q, either p  q is a priori
or p  q is a priori. I(u)(w) is the proposition that the sentence u expresses
in w. That proposition, in turn, is a function from metaphysically possible
worlds to truth values, namely, the proposition that is true in v if
I(u)(w)(v)¼Truth and otherwise is false in v. The diagonal of I(u) – i.e.
the function f such that f(w)¼Truth if I(u)(w)(w)¼Truth and otherwise
f(w)¼ Falsehood – is what Chalmers calls the primary intension of u.
According to what Chalmers (2006: 64) has dubbed the Core Thesis of his
program, a sentence is a priori iff its primary intension is true in every world.
Equivalently: u is a priori iff, for each world w, considered as an epistemic
possibility in the sense indicated above, the proposition u expresses in w is
true in w, considered as a metaphysical possibility. (What is true in a world
considered as an epistemic possibility will depend on how that world is rep-
resented – a complication that we set aside but Chalmers 2006: §3 does not.)
It is important to Chalmers’s program that some sentences have constant
2D-intensions – i.e. 2D-intensions that assign the same proposition to each
world – while others do not. The existence of non-constant 2D-intensions is
required by both the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori. The 2D-
intension of a sentence that expresses a necessary proposition but is not a priori
must, by the Core Thesis, assign a non-necessary proposition to some world.
And an a priori sentence that expresses a contingent proposition has a 2D-
intension that assigns to the actual world @ a proposition that is false in at least
one world, w*; thus, by the Core Thesis, that 2D- intension must assign to w*
some other proposition, which is true in w*. On the other hand, constant 2D-
intensions deliver the desired link between Chalmers-conceivability and possi-
bility: a sentence with a constant 2D-intension is Chalmers-conceivable iff it is
possible (i.e. expresses in @ a proposition that is possibly true).
What is the epistemological cash value of this alleged connection between
constancy of 2D-intension, Chalmers-conceivability, and possibility? And
how is Chalmers-conceivability related to conceivability in some more ordin-
ary sense? The answers to these questions depend on how we fill in the details
in the sketch of a theory above – a task to which Chalmers has devoted much
time over the last two decades. Here we can only offer a few suggestive
remarks, and we advise readers who are interested in the nitty-gritty to
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read the works by Chalmers cited in the bibliography. The key idea is that
there is an elite class of words, which Chalmers sometimes calls the ‘seman-
tically neutral’ words, and all (but not only) sentences composed entirely of
such words have constant 2D-intensions. These include perhaps, in addition
to logico-mathematical vocabulary, the vocabulary of physics and of qualia
(‘green’, ‘pain’, etc.), but not, inter alia, ordinary proper names or natural
kind terms (thusH¼P andG do not have constant 2D-intensions). Chalmers
is optimistic that there are enough semantically neutral words for us to be
able to use inferences from Chalmers-conceivability to possibility to acquire
knowledge of possibility. Perhaps, for example, ‘There are zombies’ contains
only semantically neutral words; if so, we may come to know that it is pos-
sible that there are zombies in part by finding it to be Chalmers-conceivable
that there are zombies.6 How Chalmers-conceivability is related to conceiv-
ability in some more ordinary sense is a difficult question on which
Chalmers’s own views do not appear to be entirely settled. His most recent
work (e.g., Chalmers 2012: Chs. 1–4) is suggestive of the following answer:
u is Chalmers-conceivable iff it is possible for a kind of idealized agent
(a Laplacean demon equipped with a ‘cosmoscope’) to conceive or imagine
a world in which u is true.
Another recent idea relates possibility to a kind of imaginability under sup-
positions. Defenders of this idea accept that various impossibilities, such as
H 6¼P and G, are imaginable, but they deny that anything impossible is
imaginable under correct suppositions about what is actually the case. In par-
ticular, H 6¼P and G are both allegedly unimaginable under the suppositions
that, actually, H¼P and G. The imaginability-under-suppositions approach is
typically combined with the view that, when we appear to imagine an impos-
sible proposition under correct suppositions about actuality, what we are
really imagining is some related possible proposition.7 (In Chalmers’s frame-
work, the primary intension of the sentence we use to express the impossible
proposition we appear to imagine is a plausible candidate for the related pos-
sible proposition.) Yablo (1993: 34, n. 66), Chalmers (2002: 171), and espe-
cially Gregory (2004) have defended views of this kind. Kung (2016) criticizes
such views, focusing on Yablo and Gregory.
3. Two-factor views
Two-factor views take their inspiration from a famous passage in N&N, in
which Kripke says that cases in which we come to know thatœp a posteriori
6 Chalmers (1996) originally developed his 2D approach to serve as a tool for the investi-
gation of the possibility of (philosophical) zombies and related modal questions in the
metaphysics of mind.
7 This combination of views, which Yablo (2000) has dubbed ‘textbook Kripkeanism’, is
also inspired by certain passages in N&N.
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by inferring it from the a posteriori known p and the a priori known p œp
‘may give a clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of
necessary truths’ (159). According to these views, a posteriori modal know-
ledge can always be ‘factorized’ into a modal component that is a priori and a
non-modal component that is not. (Some two-factor views concern justifica-
tion rather than knowledge. The substitution of ‘justification’ for ‘know-
ledge’ will not affect our discussion.)
Making this metaphor more precise without exposing it to pedestrian
counterexamples turns out to be challenging. One precisification deploys
a simple inferential model, on which a posteriori knowledge that œp is
gained by inference from a conditional major premise, p œp, known
a priori, together with its antecedent, p, as minor premise’ (Hale 2013:
259).
More generally, the idea is something like this: one can only know an a
posteriori modal fact by deducing it from an a priori modal fact one
knows together with an a posteriori non-modal fact one knows. The fact
that pretty much anything that can be known can be known by testimony
poses an immediate problem for this proposal. At best the simple inferential
model could be thought to describe the way an item of a posteriori modal
knowledge enters a community, whereafter it may spread by testimony.8 But
even this is questionable, since it seems to be possible for humans to know
modal facts by perception (Strohminger 2015), and one can easily imagine a
non-human agent hard-wired to, say, non-inferentially accept the necessita-
tion of an identity statement with proper names in circumstances in which a
human would accept the identity statement, thereby coming to know various
a posteriori necessities. Nor is it clear why the simple inferential model re-
quires an a priori premise: one can deduce œH¼P directly from H¼P,
without the aid of a conditional connecting the two, just as one can
deduce p _ q directly from p without the aid of p  (p _ q). Recent two-
factor theorists tend to advance more modest claims.
Casullo (2003, 2010) discusses two more modest proposals linking a prior-
ity to modality. According to one:
(K1B*) If p is a necessary truth and S knows that p is non-contingent,
then S is in a position to know a priori that p is non-contingent.
(K1B*) would allow us to ‘factorize’ knowledge that œp, which may be
a posteriori, into (p  œp) & (p  œp) (‘p is non-contingent’), which
is knowable a priori provided that it is known, and p. (p, however, may be
modal, but perhaps the idea is that when p is modal, knowledge that p can
be ‘factorized’ by iterated applications of (K1B*) into an a priori and a
8 This seems to be Peacocke’s (1999: 168–71) view.
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non-modal component.9) According to Casullo (2010: 357–58), ‘(K1B*) is
an intuitively plausible, widely accepted principle that enjoys no independent
support but faces no clear counterexamples’. Yet Anderson (1993: 11–13),
Bird (2007: 176), and Williamson10 have presented clear counterexamples to
it. To simplify Anderson’s example a bit, consider a necessary proposition N
and a contingent proposition C such that S knows a priori that N is non-
contingent, knows a priori that C is contingent, but is not in a position to
know a priori whether N or whether C. The details can be filled in in such a
way that S and the disjunction N _ C are a counterexample to (K1B*).
Casullo (2003) responds to Anderson’s counterexample by agreeing that
(K1B*) ‘is not generally true’ (198) and proposing that we recognize a class
of counterexamples to (K1B*) that lack a feature he calls ‘modal symmetry’
(196). In particular, Casullo maintains, ‘[i]n the case of [N _ C], modal
symmetry fails’ (198). This, however, is demonstrably false. Casullo defines
a proposition as modally symmetric just in case ‘regardless of the truth values
of its [truth-functionally] simple components’ (197) the proposition is such
that
either (a) if it is true then it is necessarily true and if it is false then it is
necessarily false or (b) if it is true then it is contingently true and if it is
false then it is contingently false (196).
In other words, p is modally symmetric iff p satisfies CASULLO regardless of
the truth values of its truth-functionally simple components.
CASULLO: ((p  œp) &(p  œp)) _ ((p  œp) & (p 
œp))
As the reader can check, CASULLO is a truth-functional tautology, so every
proposition is modally symmetric.
Chalmers puts forward (as ‘plausible’) yet another two-factor view, ac-
cording to which ‘all modal truths are a priori entailed by some non-
modal truths’ (2012: 273). This view does not face any well-known counter-
examples, but it is also difficult to find any powerful arguments to support it.
4. Counterfactual-based accounts
The third class of views we will discuss connect the epistemology of modality
with the epistemology of counterfactual conditionals. According to them, the
cognitive capacities that make knowledge of counterfactual conditionals pos-
sible also make modal knowledge possible. Williamson (2007: Chs. 5–6,
9 While (K1B*) could be applied in this way when, say, p is œœH¼P, cases like G  œG,
which do not seem to be a priori (see Salmon 1981: 256–60), may pose a problem.
10 Williamson’s counterexample is reported by Edgington (2004: 11).
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forthcoming) is the chief proponent of this view.11 We will call accounts of
modal knowledge that are committed to this view ‘counterfactual-based’.
Counterfactual-based views are motivated by the standard assumption that
modal logic is reducible to counterfactual logic in the way proposed by
Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973): namely, ‘œp’ is logically equivalent to
‘If it had not been the case that p, then it would have been the case that o’.
(Here ‘o’ stands for an arbitrary truth-functional contradiction.) In symbols:
(œ) œ p  (p œ! o)
Thus, by definition of S, Sp  (p œ! o).
Williamson (2007: 155–58) observes that (œ) is derivable, in the weakest
normal modal logic K,12 from two natural principles:
NECESSITY: œ (p  q)  (p œ! q)
POSSIBILITY: (p œ! q)  (Sp  Sq)
NECESSITY says that strict implication implies counterfactual implication;
POSSIBILITY says that anything counterfactually implied by a possible prop-
osition is possible.
On its own, (œ) already tells us something of epistemological interest: one
can come to know a modal truth by deducing it from a logically equivalent
counterfactual truth, provided that one can know the latter. However (pace
Hill 2014: 295) counterfactual-based accounts need not maintain that such
deductions are the only route to modal knowledge.13 An advocate of a coun-
terfactual-based view can maintain that one can come to know a modal truth
directly by using whatever method one can use to come to know an equiva-
lent counterfactual truth.
One advertised virtue of counterfactual-based views is that they obviate the
need to posit any cognitive capacities not used in ordinary life to explain
modal knowledge (Williamson 2007: 136). Furthermore, since there is a
plausible evolutionary explanation of the reliability of the processes that
produce our counterfactual judgments, an advocate of a counterfactual-
based view may hope to offer an evolutionary account of the reliability of
our modal judgments (Kroedel 2012).14 Counterfactual-based views, how-
ever, are not alone in claiming these advantages (Martı´nez 2015, Vetter
2016).
11 Williamson (forthcoming) cites N&N (50, 113) as a precedent.
12 K is characterized by the axiom œ (u c)  (œu œc) and the rule u/œu, where u is a
theorem.
13 See Williamson 2016c: 801–2, n. 1.
14 One might also try to explain why it is that we are incapable of knowing certain modal
truths by appealing to our unreliability in evaluating counterfactuals logically equivalent to
them (Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri forthcoming: §5).
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Counterfactual-based views also need not directly compete with the views
discussed in §§2–3. One could hold any combination of them. For example,
one could propose that a form of the principle that imaginability entails or is
evidence of possibility falls out of a proper account of the role of the imagin-
ation in the epistemology of counterfactuals. (Chalmers 2002: 171 on ‘sec-
ondary conceivability’ and Gregory 2004 are suggestive here.) One could
also combine a counterfactual-based view with a two-factor view (as Hill
2006 does) or, as Malmgren (2011) observes, with the view that ‘intuitions’
are required for some modal knowledge.
One way to challenge counterfactual-based views is to challenge the re-
duction of modal to counterfactual logic on which they rest. This will involve
rejecting either NECESSITY or POSSIBILITY, which together imply (œ).
Critics of counterfactual-based views almost invariably reject NECESSITY
but accept POSSIBILITY. A notable recent example is Lowe (2012), who
rejects NECESSITY, accepts POSSIBILITY, and proposes (following Lowe
1995) the following reduction of counterfactual to modal logic as a basis for
an alternative combined epistemology of counterfactuals and modality.
LOWE: (p œ! q)  (œ (p  q) & (Sp _ œq))
Lowe’s position is clearly false. First, in the uncontroversial modal logic
KT, LOWE is inconsistent with the approximately equally uncontroversial
principle of Reflexivity: p œ! p (everything counterfactually implies
itself).15 The falsehood of LOWE, then, is at least as certain as the validity
of KT and Reflexivity. Second, even if we deny the validity of both
Reflexivity and KT, we will presumably still want to affirm some instances
of Reflexivity, such as: if the atomic number of gold had not been 79, then
the atomic number of gold would not have been 79. But by LOWE this
platitude implies the falsehood that it is either possible or necessary that
the atomic number of gold is not 79. Third, a philosopher who is willing
to bite this last bullet presumably does so by accepting the principle that an
impossible proposition counterfactually implies nothing (and so does not
counterfactually imply itself). But LOWE is inconsistent with that principle:
by LOWE every impossible proposition counterfactually implies every neces-
sary proposition, so, in particular, if the atomic number of gold had not been
79, then the atomic number of gold would have been 79! Fourth, in S5,16
which is plausibly the logic of metaphysical modality, LOWE implies that all
15 KT results from adding to K axiom T (œu u), which says that necessity implies truth.
(oœ! o)  (œ (o o) & (So_ œo)) is an instance of LOWE, and this and
Reflexivity imply the KT-inconsistent and manifestly false So _ œo. LOWE is also
inconsistent with Reflexivity in KD, whose characteristic axiom, œu  Su, says that
necessity implies possibility.
16 S5 results from adding axiom 5 (Su  œSu) to KT.
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counterfactuals are non-contingent, so, for example, if it is true that Trump
would have won the general election even if he had lost California’s 10th
congressional district, then it is necessary that Trump would have won the
general election if he had lost CA-10 (Trump’s victory is metaphysically
necessitated by his loss of CA-10!). Finally, we note that several of Lowe’s
objections to Williamson’s proposal are at least equally powerful objections
to LOWE. For example, Lowe objects to Williamson’s proposal on the
grounds that it entails the equivalence of œp with p œ! p (this ‘strains
my credulity’ [2012: 930, n. 7]) and with 8q(q œ! p) (‘an extraordinarily
big claim’ [929]). Yet LOWE also entails the equivalence of œp with p
œ! p and with 8q(q œ! p).17
A second objection, which we have not found in the literature, runs as
follows. Counterfactuals are context-sensitive. In ordinary contexts we use
them to generalize over not all metaphysical possibilities but only some rele-
vant ones. (œ) will only hold in special contexts in which œ! is used to
generalize over all of the metaphysical possibilities. One might worry about
whether one can ever get into that kind of context; if one cannot, then one
can never truly assert the equivalence on which counterfactual-based views
rely.18 One possible reply, which strikes us as plausible, is that a counterfac-
tual of the form p œ! o tends to have the effect of shifting the context
into one in which one does generalize over all possibilities, so one can some-
times get into the right kind of context simply by asserting (œ). This view can
be supported by appreciating the disorienting effect of B’s response to A and
the naturalness of A’s response to B below.
A: Trump could not have won California.
B: So, if Trump had won California, then he would have been both
human and not human.
A: What? That’s false! Surely Trump could have won California with-
out being both human and not human. For example, if only white men
had voted in California, Trump would have won California. But he
wouldn’t have then been both human and not human.
17 œu is equivalent to œ (u u) and therefore to œ (u u) & (Su_ œu) in K, so, by
LOWE, œu is equivalent to u œ! u. In the standard axiomatization of propositionally
quantified K (AxK in Fine 1970), œ (u u) is equivalent to 8pœ (p  u), so to 8p(œ
(p  u) & (Sp _ œu)), so, by LOWE, œu is equivalent to 8p(p œ! u). The equivalence
of œu with 8p(œ (p  u) & (Sp _ œu)) can also be shown using the standard semantics
for propositionally quantified modal logic, in which the variables are interpreted by the
powerset of the model’s set of worlds (Fine 1970, Kaplan 1970).
18 Vetter (2016) raises a related worry: natural language counterfactuals have epistemic read-
ings, on which (œ) fails. But even if we are able to get into a context in which only non-
epistemic readings are relevant – as we presumably are – (œ) will fail if the non-epistemic
readings are restricted.
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The effect of B’s assertion appears to be similar to that of familiar examples
of domain-expanding sentences. We may truly assert ‘Everyone has a pencil
and paper’, meaning by it that everyone in the classroom has a pencil and
paper. But if we follow this up with ‘Everyone in the universe has a pencil and
paper’, we have said something false, and that can only be because we are
speaking in a new context in which the ‘everyone’ is not restricted by an
implicit ‘in this classroom’. Counterfactuals of the form pœ! o appear to
have a similar effect.19
5. Stepping back
Our discussion so far has focused on three putative ways of obtaining modal
knowledge: by means of certain kinds of imaginative exercises, by whatever
methods yield a priori knowledge, and by whatever methods yield counter-
factual knowledge. It is clear that there are other methods. For example, since
one can come to know thatSp and (given S5) thatœSp by deducing these
from one’s knowledge that p, any method whatsoever that generates know-
ledge is capable of generating knowledge of both necessity and possibility
when combined with deduction. Some less obvious examples of other meth-
ods are discussed in the recent literature. Williamson (2016a) discusses a
variety of ways in which natural science delivers knowledge of certain re-
stricted objective modalities, such as nomological possibility and nonzero
objective probability, from which knowledge of metaphysical possibility
can be derived. Yli-Vakkuri (2013: §3) argues that having a proof that p is
in some cases sufficient for knowing that œp. Strohminger (2015) argues
that one can sometimes know that Sp by perception and deduction even
when p is false: for example, one can know that a cup that never breaks is
breakable by perception, and deduce from this that it is possible that the cup
breaks. Roca-Royes (2016) argues that one can sometimes know that Sp,
when p is false, by an inductive inference: for example, if one knows that
various duplicates of a certain cup that never breaks possibly break (because
they have broken), one can infer, and thereby come to know, that it is pos-
sible that the cup breaks.
While our discussion, like the literature, has focused on knowledge of
particular modal facts, such as œH¼P and œG, the epistemology of mo-
dality of course also encompasses the epistemology of the most general modal
facts. As such it overlaps the methodology of the metaphysics and logic of
modality. One view here, defended by Lewis (1986: 3) and more recently by
Williamson (2013: 423–29), is that the correct methodology of these areas of
philosophy is abductive. According to this view, the correct way to evaluate a
19 Ichikawa (2016: 139) has also noticed the apparent context-shifting potential of sentences
of the form p œ! o, but he thinks this is a problem for Williamson’s view. We
disagree.
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principle of modal logic-cum-metaphysics, such as the necessitist principle
œ8xœ9y x¼ y (‘necessarily everything is necessarily something’), is to de-
velop necessitist and anti-necessitist theories and to compare these for sim-
plicity, strength, and any other theoretical virtues.
Recently, Sider (2016) has challenged this view by arguing that modal logic
and metaphysics lack the kind of connection to fundamental science which
according to him legitimizes the application of abductive methodology to
various non-fundamental sciences. Sider’s challenge to Williamson’s abduc-
tivism rests in part on his conventionalist conception of modality (Sider 2011:
Ch. 12), according to which, roughly, to be necessary is to be a logical con-
sequence of a list of ‘modal axioms’, the membership of which is determined
by, and fickly depends on, the global pattern of our use of the modal words.
Roughly speaking, Sider proposes that œ is semantically plastic in the way
Williamson (1994) thinks vague words are.20 In his reply, Williamson
(2016b) both criticizes Sider’s account of the legitimacy of abductive meth-
odology for non-fundamental science and argues for the continuity of modal
logic-cum-metaphysics with fundamental science. Meanwhile, Strohminger
(2013: 398) argues that Sider’s conventionalism supports no revisionary epis-
temological conclusions.
In a survey of work on the epistemology of modality one might also hope
to find some discussion of work aspiring to greater generality concerning the
subject matter of the epistemology of modality itself. While much of the
discussion in the literature concerns fairly specific principles such as
(K1B*), one can also raise far more general questions, such as: what are
all of the truths expressible by the sentences of a language in which œ and
a knowledge operator (or some other epistemic operator) are the only non-
truth-functional logical operators, and the atomic sentences are understood
as variables ranging over all propositions? In asking such a question one is
asking for a combined logic of knowledge (or some other epistemic notion)
and modality. Recent years have seen an increase in interest in epistemic-
modal logics. For example, Fritz (2013, 2014) investigates the logic of œ,
actuality, and a priority; Chalmers and Rabern (2014) investigate the logic of
œ and a priority; and Litland and Yli-Vakkuri (2016) and Yli-Vakkuri
(2016) investigate the logic of œ, actuality, and an epistemic definiteness
operator. This recent work has uncovered some new problems related to
old topics such as the contingent a priori. For example, Chalmers and
Rabern (2014) take as their starting point the following puzzle (due to
Forbes 2011): (A1)–(A3) are inconsistent in K.
(A1) Ap & œp
(A2) Ap  œAp
(A3) œ (Ap  p)
20 The term ‘semantic plasticity’ is from Hawthorne (2006).
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Yet, when ‘A’ is interpreted as expressing a priority, (A1) is true on some
interpretation of ‘p’, provided that there are contingent a priori truths, and
(A2) (if p is a priori then p is necessarily a priori) and (A3) (necessarily, if p is
a priori, then p is true) are prima facie plausible on any interpretation of ‘p’.
Modal-epistemic logic has the potential to both deliver solutions to such
puzzles and introduce greater systematicity and rigour into our thinking
about the epistemology of modality.21
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